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Abstract 
Objectives To examine the impact of memory accessibility on episodic future thinking. 
Design Single case study of neurological patient HCM and an age-matched comparison 
group of neurologically healthy controls. 
Methods We administered a full battery of tests assessing general intelligence, memory and 
executive functioning. To assess autobiographical memory, the Autobiographical Memory 
Interview (Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 1990) was administered. The Past Episodic and 
Future Episodic sections of Dalla Barba’s Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993) and a 
specifically tailored Mental Time Travel Questionnaire were administered to assess future 
thinking in HCM and age-matched controls.  
Results HCM presented with a deficit in forming new memories (anterograde amnesia) and 
recalling events from before the onset of neurological impairment (retrograde amnesia). 
HCM’s autobiographical memory impairments are characterised by a paucity of memories 
from recent life. In comparison with controls, two features of his future thoughts are 
apparent: Reduced episodic future thinking and outdated content of his episodic future 
thoughts. 
Conclusions This paper suggests we should look beyond popular conceptualisations of the 
past-future relation in amnesia via focussing on reduced future thinking. Investigating both 
the quantity and quality of future thoughts produced by amnesic patients may lead to 
developments in understanding the complex nature of future thinking disorders resulting from 
memory impairments. 
Practitioner Points 
 We highlight the clinical importance of examining the content of future thoughts in 
amnesic patients, rather than only its quantitative reduction. 
 We propose an explanation of how quantitative and qualitative aspects of future 
thinking could be affected by amnesia. This could provide a useful approach to 
understand clinical cases of impaired prospection. 
Limitations 
 Systematic group investigations are required to fully examine our hypothesis. 
 Although the current study utilised typical future thinking measures, these may be 
limited and we highlight the need to develop clinically-relevant measures of 
prospection. 
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Amnesia and Future Thinking: Exploring the Role of Memory in the Quantity and 
Quality of Episodic Future Thoughts 
Throughout our waking lives, we ponder our future at least as frequently as 
remembering our past (D’Argembeau, Renaud & Van der Linden, 2011). Research from 
neuroimaging has demonstrated that in addition to its recognised role in remembering 
specific events from one’s past (i.e., episodic recollection), the episodic memory system also 
underlies the ability to imagine events that may come to pass (i.e., episodic future thinking; 
see Schacter, Addis, Hassabis et al., 2012 for a detailed review). As Schacter & Addis (2009) 
propose under the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, “episodic memory supports 
the construction of future events by extracting and recombining stored information into a 
simulation of a novel event” (p.1246). Hence, past remembering and episodic future thinking 
are seen as two sides of the same coin and share many characteristics: amongst other things, 
both involve the self, scene construction and vivid imagery (Rathbone, Conway & Moulin, 
2011; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). For these reasons, 
and others, both are often described using the general term; mental time travel (Wheeler, 
Stuss & Tulving, 1997). One key difference however is that episodic recollection can be 
verified whereas episodic future thoughts vary on the degree to which the simulation maps 
onto one’s expected future. Here, we define episodic future thinking as the construction of a 
personally plausible future event (see Cole, Fotopoulou, Oddy & Moulin, 2014) following 
common definitions employed in experimental work (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007; 
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).   
If the ‘building blocks’ of episodic future thoughts  are episodic memories, then 
amnesics, with limited or complete loss of accessible episodic memories, should be severely 
deficient when attempting to describe the future. This is exactly what has been found in the 
foregoing literature. In fact, the crucial role of memory in episodic future thinking has never 
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been more clearly illustrated than by the reduction in the detail and spatial coherence of 
future thinking (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 2007) or complete absence  of future 
thinking (e.g., KC, Tulving, 1985, see also Rosenbaum et al., 2005) found in dense amnesic 
patients.  
Until now, studies of amnesia have mostly examined episodic future thinking using 
methods that quantify aspects of future thoughts such as spatial coherence and amount of 
episodic detail (Hassabis, et al., 2007; Race, Keane & Verfaellie, 2011) or the quantity of 
episodic future thoughts themselves (e.g., Andelman, Hoofien, Goldberg, Aizenstein, & 
Neufeld, 2010), possibly because research questions concern the involvement (or not) of 
episodic memory in future simulation. Typically, a significant reduction of episodic future 
thinking in amnesics, compared to age-matched non-brain-damaged controls has been found 
in almost all published studies (Andelman et al., 2010; Hassabis, et al., 2007; Klein, Loftus & 
Kihlstrom, 2002; Race et al., 2011; Tulving, 1985; although see Squire et al., 2010 and 
Discussion). A similar approach has been employed to study the past-future link in dementia 
(e.g., Addis, Sacchetti, Ally et al., 2009; Gamboz et al., 2010) with largely concordant 
findings. This, along with research from imaging neuroscience and cognitive psychology, has 
shown that one necessary cognitive function for episodic future thinking is a psychologically 
and neurologically unimpaired episodic memory system (see Schacter et al., 2012 for a 
review). This assertion lies at the heart of recent theories of episodic memory and future 
thinking; particularly the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 
2007).  
In their commentary of Suddendorf & Corballis’ (2007) influential article, Tulving 
and Kim (2007), outlined two important dimensions of episodic future thinking; the 
neuropsychological capacity to engage in episodic future thinking (the medium), and the 
‘mental activity’ that denotes its cognitive expression (the message). However, the 
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application of this taxonomy has been left wanting; especially in Neuropsychology. The 
extant research on amnesia and mental time travel has focussed on deficits in the medium 
(i.e., negative symptoms represented by fewer responses on questionnaires measuring the 
underlying capacity of mental time travel) rather than analysing its qualitative nature, or 
message (i.e., positive symptoms represented by the meaning/content of each response).  
An exception to this general emphasis on the medium is the recent interest in the 
linguistic characteristics of the content of episodic past and future thought produced by 
amnesics. Specifically, these studies investigated the interactive discourse (McKinley, 
McVittie & Della Salla, 2010) and narrative (Race, Keane & Verfaellie, 2015) characteristics 
of past and future thoughts. These studies diverge from traditional analysis of the medium, 
and examined hitherto unknown linguistic aspects of mental time travel, and similar to this 
paper, examine the meaning evident in episodic future thought narratives. The aim of the 
present study, however, was not to understand the impact of researcher-patient discourse 
(McKinley et al., 2010) or narrative characteristics per se (Race et al., 2015), but to attempt 
to investigate if and to what extent memory inaccessibility can affect the manifest content of 
episodic future thought.  
Herein we argue that the examination of the medium of mental time travel in amnesia 
is too restrictive, focussing exclusively on prescribed failings of prospection, answering 
specific theoretical questions, but potentially missing other theoretically and clinically 
relevant issues. An implication of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis is that the 
‘islands of memories’ which are available in amnesia will be drawn upon as the building 
blocks of episodic future thoughts. However, the emphasis on the medium of episodic future 
thinking means that this possibility remains underexplored.  
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It is typical that instead of resulting in complete episodic memory loss, amnesia 
involves memory loss which extends temporally before the onset of the amnesia by months, 
years or decades (Kopelman, 2002). This is termed retrograde amnesia (RA) and 
accompanies the more characteristic type of amnesia observed following neurological injury, 
the inability to form new memories after the onset of amnesia, termed anterograde amnesia 
(AA), commonly resulting in a limited pool of distant memories available in amnesia.  
If memories are the ‘building blocks’ of future events, the type and amount of 
memories available to amnesic individuals will determine the amount and content of their 
episodic future thoughts. Patients with AA and ‘islands’ of unimpaired access to remote 
memories (see Medved & Hirst, 2010) may provide informative data because they can 
highlight the importance of how accessible memories can be drawn upon in episodic future 
thinking. In these particular patients, we would expect that episodic future thoughts would 
lack relevance to ongoing goals, providing an outdated view of “now” and the future 
(Conway, Loveday & Cole, 2015). Importantly, episodic future thinking, which arguably 
underlies and influences goal-directed cognition (Cole & Berntsen, 2015; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, Spreng & Schacter, 2014) may lose its adaptiveness and become 
currently irrelevant and maladaptive. For example, a retired patient may simulate a future 
scenario from mnemonic details extracted from when they were a city banker several decades 
ago. Specifically, without a healthy functioning episodic memory system, we predicted that 
the personal plausibility of episodic future thoughts (and their relevance to current reality) 
would be significantly reduced. To this end, we assessed the quantity and qualities of 
episodic future thoughts in a patient with amnesia and compared his responses to those of 
age-matched neurologically healthy controls. We present patient HCM, who presented with 
AA and temporally graded RA.  
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HCM 
We report HCM’s neuropsychological test scores from 2013 (Table 1) and a 
neuroradiological scan from 2008 (Figure 1). Testing of his autobiographical memory, 
confabulation and mental time travel abilities took place in 2011. This project obtained 
approval from the UK National Research Ethics Service committee and Neurorehabilitation 
Centre. 
 
Biographical Information 
HCM is a 66 year old male. He attended primary school (5-12 years), and successfully 
gained access to the higher level of secondary schooling (Grammar School) by passing entry 
examinations at 11 years. In accordance with his secondary schooling, HCM passed 11/13 
Ordinary Level General Certificate of Education (GCE) Examinations. He achieved a higher 
educational qualification in Electrical Engineering at a college whilst working at the postal 
service. He also completed a degree and studied toward a doctorate (only first year 
completed). In terms of familial relationships, he married in the UK, fathered four children 
and moved to Germany. He is now separated from his wife and lives under the 24-hour care 
at a neuropsychological rehabilitation centre in the north of England. His children visit him 
regularly. 
Medical History 
HCM has a history of neurological damage resulting from several cerebrovascular 
injuries. Earliest evidence of such an injury was a cardiovascular accident in 1998 (at 51 
years old). This resulted in a left lateralised haemorrhage which required a craniotomy to 
alleviate pressure. He also sustained two traumatic head injuries, one in 2000 (at 53 years) 
when he was assaulted with a blow to the head and one in 2002 (at 55) when he fell down a 
staircase. After being hospitalised, he was admitted to a specialist neurobehavioural 
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assessment and post-acute rehabilitation centre for people with acquired brain injury to 
remediate ongoing cognitive, behavioural and physical deficits.   
Based on clinical notes and a neuroradiologist assessment of a structural MRI brain 
scan from 2008 (see Figure 1), there was evidence of small vessel change, micro-infarcts in 
subcortical areas (e.g., cerebellum and basal ganglia) and enlarged ventricles (around 50% 
larger than healthy controls based on the Neuroradiologist’s assessment). Although many of 
these micro-infarcts would have been asymptomatic, it is probable that HCM suffered a 
transient ischemic attack in 2010 evidenced by a CT scan. Although potentially germane to 
his memory difficulties, identification of damage to the hippocampal complex was unfeasible 
due to the section (axial and sagittal views included; no coronal view available) and 
resolution of the available MRI scan. The general neurological picture was of multiple 
diffusely spread infarcts indicative of global atrophy extending to both cortical and 
subcortical regions. His medication largely addressed his mood and physical problems1.  
Neuropsychological Profile 
HCM was tested by two trainee Clinical Psychologists. Although HCM agreed to 
participate and was enthusiastic about participating (in both Neuropsychological Tests and 
Experimental Measures), he required 11 testing sessions to complete a battery of varied 
psychometric testing (see Table 1). This was due to HCM repeatedly stopping testing when 
he became aware of his inability to complete tasks to pre-injury levels. This suggests that 
although he had online awareness of his reduced abilities, this did not augment his global 
self-knowledge of his current abilities (see Toglia & Kirk, 2000).   
General Cognitive Function. By administering the TOPF-UK (Wechsler, 2011), an 
estimate of pre-morbid cognitive function can be determined. HCM scored within normative 
range on all sections of this test (see Table 1). He also completed the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale IV (WAIS-IV, Wechsler, 2008), covering four indices of current cognitive 
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function. Scores on the TOPF-UK and WAIS-IV have a mean of 100 and standard deviation 
of 15. When compared with his current cognitive abilities (WAIS-IV scores), scores on 
TOPF-UK showed that working memory, perceptual reasoning and processing speed were 
most affected by his neurological injuries (scores = 55, 63, 50 versus 106, 104, 101, 
respectively). His working memory deficit is illustrated by his poor performance on digit 
span and mental arithmetic tasks (scores = 3 and 1, respectively). His poor performance on 
perceptual reasoning and processing speed index may also be due to fundamental working 
memory deficits, as the subtests he had most difficulty with required manipulation and 
storage of information (e.g. visual puzzles on the Perceptual Reasoning Index). In contrast, 
his linguistic abilities were a perpetual strength of his cognitive profile and remained within 
the normal range.  
HCM’s orientation was examined using a subsection of the Confabulation Battery 
which assesses orientation in time and place (Dalla Barba, 1993). This showed that HCM had 
difficulty in estimating current temporal information and was unable to provide an answer 
concerning the current day, date or month (see Table 3). Also, HCM was unable to recall 
when he was admitted to the rehabilitation unit. His current year estimate predated the current 
year by a decade. Knowledge of current location was more accurate: HCM accurately 
described the country, city, and building (‘hospital building’) indicating that he did not have 
global unawareness of his current situation.  
Memory. The Wechsler Memory Scale IV (WMS-IV; Wechsler, 2009) assesses 
different domains including working, visual and verbal memory. HCM performed 
particularly poorly on tests involving visual information and delayed recall compared with 
the estimated population mean of 100 (see Table 1). These difficulties were compounded 
when HCM was asked to replicate any of the pictures he was presented with; immediately or 
after a 25-30 minute delay. Actually, on all tests involving a delay between study and test, 
AMNESIA AND FUTURE THINKING  10 
 
HCM scored at floor level, saying that he was not able to remember anything the clinician 
referred to in these tasks (e.g., visual reproduction II & logical memory II, standard scores, 
both = 1). His verbal immediate memory was the least impaired, and HCM was able to recall 
portions of a story just previously read aloud (logical memory I, standard score = 9). 
However, despite these moderate-at-best abilities, HCM was unable to retain information 
over short durations regardless of modality. This, and the fact that he was unable to 
remember meeting the first author, who met him three weeks previously, underlines HCM’s 
anterograde amnesia. 
Executive Function. Five tests from a standardised battery of executive function 
(Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System, Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001) were 
administered. See Table 1 for scores (Mean=10, Standard deviation=3). HCM was very 
competent at reasoning, evidenced by scoring above average on the 20 questions test in 
which the most effective yes/no questions should be self-generated in order to obtain the 
identity of an object from a visually presented array (standard score = 14). HCM’s principal 
executive deficit was in the domain of cognitive switching (verbal fluency, standard score = 
2). Therefore, HCM presented with executive dysfunction restricted to abstract thinking (see 
Proverbs test, standard score =7) and switching in the context of spared reasoning abilities.   
Experimental Measures 
Method 
Materials 
 Three questionnaires were administered to HCM to determine the extent of episodic 
and semantic autobiographical memory disturbances, subjective temporal experience and 
mental time travel abilities. These were the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; 
Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 1990), Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993) and 
Mental Time Travel Questionnaire, respectively. To provide a comparison for HCM’s 
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responses, a case-control design was employed whereby three healthy participants of a 
similar age (Range, 61-67, one male), with no history of brain injury, were administered the 
same Questionnaires (with a shortened version of the Confabulation Battery). For accuracy 
verification purposes, a copy of each participant’s responses was sent to a close relative. 
Memories were rated for whether they happened as described and future events were judged 
for likelihood of occurring to that individual (1-5 scale, cf. personal plausibility, see Scoboria 
et al., 2004). Employing confederate ratings represents a methodologically rigorous aspect to 
this study that is not commonly adopted in studies of future thinking. Where appropriate, 
Crawford & Garthwaite’s (2002) t-test and Crawford, Garthwait and Porter’s (2010) effect 
size estimates (zcc) were computed which are tests designed for comparing single cases with a 
small control group. 
Autobiographical Memory Interview. To assess HCM’s knowledge of his childhood, 
early adulthood and recent life, the AMI (Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 1990) was 
administered. This test assesses knowledge of incidents and personal semantics across life 
periods, with greater scores granted for detailed responses, which are compared to the range 
of scores expected in the healthy population (using the AMI manual). In addition, the 
specificity of autobiographical incidents reported by HCM and age-matched controls were 
compared on a measure of episodic specificity; the qualitative 0-3 scale used in Kopelman et 
al. (1990). Using this scale, a response based on semantics or no response is rated 0, a vague 
personal memory is rated 1, a moderately specific event (personal but non-specific or specific 
without time and place detail) is rated 2, and a full episodic memory specific in time and 
place is rated 3.   
Subjective Temporal Experience. The full Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery (Dalla 
Barba, 1993) was administered as it included past and future episodic questions, an 
orientation section, and two sections probing public and personal semantic information (Dalla 
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Barba, Cappelletti, Signorini & Denes, 1997) 2. No additional prompts were provided. 
Healthy Controls were only administered Past and Future Episodic Sections. 
All responses were transcribed and coded according to Dalla Barba’s criteria (e.g., all 
responses except “don’t know” were classified as confabulations in Don’t Know sections). 
Confabulations were determined by consulting rehabilitation staff and HCM’s son. Although 
past events can be classified as confabulatory if they are grossly inaccurate, future 
confabulations may appear difficult to assess as there is no experienced event for comparison. 
However, future confabulations can be conceived as personally plausible or implausible  (by 
individuals aware of his/her probable future), hence ‘future confabulations’ were determined 
via a scale of personal plausibility (also see Cole et al., 2014; Dalla Barba et al., 1997 & 
Klein et al., 2002 for related discussions). If confederate ratings indicated unlikely events (1 
or 2, on a 1-5 scale of occurrence probability for the tested individual, 1=not at all likely, 5 
=extremely likely), they were classed as confabulatory unless inaccuracies were minor. 
Finally, the amount of accurate and omitted responses was also recorded. In this way, 
distortions, accuracy and omissions in all sections were assessed.  
Mental Time Travel Questionnaire. A further Mental Time Travel Questionnaire was 
administered, which assessed episodic past then episodic future thinking at three temporal 
distances from the present (one week, 6-12 months, 5-10 years, presented sequentially). 
Participants were instructed to remember a specific past event or imagine a specific future 
event that will take place in each temporal period. A maximum of two experimenter prompts 
were provided (e.g., can you remember a specific event?), and they were rated on specificity 
using the AMI scale (Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 1990) which was easily adapted to 
classify past and future events3.  
To clarify, whereas the AMI covers temporal periods of one’s recent life (past 5 
years), early adulthood and childhood, the past and future periods covered by the other two 
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questionnaires extend to temporally near events (Confabulation Battery) and up to ten years 
into the past/future (Mental Time Travel Questionnaire).  
Results 
Autobiographical Memory Interview 
The results displayed in Table 2 show HCM’s scores and the range expected in 
healthy individuals (from AMI Manual). For questions probing personal semantics, HCM 
was able to remember a variety of facts from childhood (ages 4-16 years). Specifically, he 
was able to name school friends, schools, and a college he attended from that period. 
However, his responses fell below the normative range for Early Adulthood (for example, he 
could not remember the date or place of his marriage) and there was a paucity of information 
for Recent Life: He was unable to name any of the staff at the rehabilitation centre or where 
he was last Christmas (three months prior to testing).  
In terms of episodic remembering, HCM was able to recall specific events from 
Childhood, within the normal range and similar to that of age-matched controls (see Table 2). 
For instance, HCM vividly described a school Rugby trip, including specific details such as 
how he washed. His episodic recall from Early Adulthood was somewhat impaired, falling 
below the normative range (but not significantly different from controls). This period of 
recalled events covers periods from HCM’s College life (age 16+) until the birth of his first 
child (age 31). As HCM’s first stroke was in 1998, his limitations recalling events from this 
period are likely due to retrograde memory deficits. HCM also had clear deficits in recalling 
any event from Recent Life (previous 5 years) - far below the lower bound of healthy 
individuals and age-matched controls (see Table 2). Of three opportunities, the only verified 
recent event HCM described within Recent Life was a description of general scenarios which 
occur regularly at the rehabilitation centre (see Appendix)4.  
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HCM’s son verified the majority of HCM’s responses. Only minor errors and 
inaccuracies were noted, indicating deficient memory, rather than confabulation, and 
therefore RA for the Early Adulthood period. In contrast, the onset of his neurological 
impairments occurring between 51 - 55 years of age, indicates an AA cause for his 
impairments in memory for Recent Life. 
 
The Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery 
 
The complete scores (correct, confabulatory, incorrect or “don’t know”) on all 
subcategories of the Battery are presented in Table 3. In terms of knowledge of public events 
(General Semantic section), HCM was unable to name the current Prime Minister but 
retained good knowledge of many temporally distant public happenings which were probably 
well-learnt facts (e.g. When did World War II start? What happened to President Kennedy?).  
Importantly, regarding his answers on the Past Episodic section, HCM’s responses 
were characterised by errors of omission, responding with “don’t know” for 8/10 questions 
(in comparison, age-matched controls produced 0/10 “don’t know” responses). Additionally, 
HCM produced significantly fewer correct responses than healthy controls (t(2)= 6.93, p < 
.05, two-tailed, zcc = -8), and his responses were vague and general. 
In the Future Episodic section, HCM responded “don’t know” to 4/10 questions 
which happened on zero questions in heathy age-matched controls. HCM was unable to 
imagine any temporally and spatially specific future event probed throughout this 
questionnaire. Of HCM’s future thoughts, two were judged unlikely to happen by his son. For 
instance, spending next Christmas with family and going to talk to somebody about his daily 
plans (likelihood ratings for both = 2, on a 1-5 scale). Of his two other future event responses, 
one was judged on the mid-point of the likelihood scale (a trip to the restaurant, likelihood 
rating = 3) and the other was rated somewhat likely by his son (a possible holiday abroad, 
likelihood rating = 4). Overall, compared to healthy controls, HCM’s imagined future events 
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were judged as less likely to transpire (Healthy Controls, M = 4.67, SD = 0.35; t(2) = 5.37, p 
< .05, two-tailed, zcc = -6.20). We present a representative excerpt from HCM’s responses 
and those of healthy controls in the Appendix, including ratings of likelihood. 
 
Mental Time Travel Questionnaire 
 
In the Memory section of this task, HCM’s first response to all cues was that he was 
unable to remember anything, and prompting twice for specific events for each temporal cue 
aided the retrieval of only two memories that were not specific (both were personal memories 
without reference to time and place). Both were partially accurate according to HCM’s son. 
Hence, HCM produced no specific personal memories. This was in stark contrast to matched 
controls who, on average, produced a high percentage (89%) of specific memories and 
overall 94% were verified as wholly accurate by confederates. Healthy controls also required 
fewer prompts than HCM to generate specific memories (M = 0.33, SD = 0.58 versus HCM = 
2 per memory). 
For the Future section, HCM gave responses to 2/3 future cues, which were both 
temporally distant (6-12 months, 5-10 years), and rated as highly implausible by his son and 
rehabilitation staff (likelihood = 2, both). HCM’s future thoughts were both classed as non-
specific personal events, whereas the majority (67%) of controls’ future thoughts, on average, 
were classed as specific. Also, these future scenarios were significantly less likely to occur 
than those produced by healthy controls (Controls, M = 4.6, SD = 0.23, t(2)= 9.79, p < .01, 
two-tailed, zcc = -11.30). Illustrating the improbability of these events, HCM stated that he 
would invite his family to his apartment. In fact, he owns a local apartment but is no longer 
able to access this due to mobility problems. Clinical staff confirmed he had not resided at his 
apartment since admission and was not expected to live there in the future. Nevertheless, 
HCM voluntarily imagined a scenario involving his apartment. In a similar vein, in 5-10 
years he envisioned ‘passing’ a variety of clinical examinations and moving into his 
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apartment. Both of these events would be unlikely to occur to HCM (i.e., they would be 
personally implausible, see Cole et al., 2014), according to clinicians and his son, suggesting 
that his future thoughts were outdated. 
Discussion 
In this paper, we aimed to highlight how amnesia can affect the quantity and quality 
of future thinking following the distinction between the medium and message of mental time 
travel used by Tulving and Kim (2007). To investigate this, we assessed a patient with 
neurological damage, HCM, who had an extended period of anterograde memory deficits, 
and temporally graded retrograde amnesia. In contrast to his memory disorder and other more 
moderate cognitive deficits (e.g., some specific executive deficits, see Neuropsychological 
Profile), his comprehension and linguistic abilities were unimpaired. By investigating HCM’s 
past and future thinking using a neuropsychological approach, we replicated a robust finding 
from prior studies of amnesic patients demonstrating a severely reduced episodic future 
thinking ability (see Schacter et al., 2012), which largely mirrored HCM’s deficit in past 
remembering (e.g., when asked what he did yesterday, he replied “can’t remember at all”, see 
Appendix). In addition, and for the first time, we demonstrated how the unavailability of 
recent semantic and episodic autobiographical knowledge but availability of distant semantic 
and episodic autobiographical knowledge can fundamentally affect the content of future 
thoughts. Specifically, HCM incorporated outdated autobiographical knowledge to describe 
his self-perceived future: HCM’s future thoughts were judged as grossly implausible within 
the context of his current cognitive and physical capabilities. Although this case investigation 
requires replication in groups studies of neurological patients (see ‘Methodological 
Limitations’ below), the novelty and value of this study is to highlight the relation between 
memory impairment and the (outdated) content of future thoughts. 
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In general, HCM’s descriptions of his personal past and future can be characterised by 
a reduction of episodic information (similar to the ‘blankness’ of the subjective past and 
future experienced by patient KC, as reported by Tulving, 1985). HCM’s first response to 
almost all past cues on the Mental Time Travel Questionnaire and Dalla Barba’s 
Confabulation Battery was that he was unable to remember anything and he has profound 
difficulties generating specific upcoming events (indicating a reduced medium, see also 
patient MC, Andelman et al., 2010). Furthermore, in the Future Episodic section of the 
Confabulation Battery, most responses that were not ‘don’t know’ responses were judged as 
personally implausible. Also, in the Mental Time Travel questionnaire, HCM generated 
personally implausible imagined future scenarios in this way, indicating a distorted message 
(although there are clearly several dimensions on which the content of episodic future 
thinking potentially varies, e.g., emotional positivity). Notably, none of HCM’s future 
scenarios described his ongoing difficulties arising from his neurological impairments, or 
attempts to remediate them within rehabilitation: Activities that would have occurred 
frequently during the past decade. This pattern of results indicates that the content of future 
thought is inherently linked to accessibility of autobiographical memories. This data also 
indicates that HCM’s distant semantic personal facts were more available than recent 
semantics, as suggested by his AMI responses. Indeed, recent data from patients with 
dementia indicates that semantic memory may have an important role in generating plausible 
episodic future thoughts (see semantic scaffolding hypothesis, Irish, Addis, Hodges & Piguet, 
2012).  
Importantly, the ability to remember the past and imagine the future is argued to 
contribute to our sense of a temporally extended self (Klein et al., 2002; Prebble, Addis & 
Tippett, 2013) This extended “now” may be especially relevant for tracking personal goals 
(see Cole & Berntsen, 2015; and Conway, Loveday & Cole, under review, for a theoretical 
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examination). Considering this, and the proposed functional role of future thinking in 
anticipation and planning (Klein et al., 2002; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), we propose a 
broader investigative approach to mental time travel in individuals with memory deficits, 
rather than studies limited to examining the impact of memory disorders on only its 
retrospective component.  
 In terms of a possible explanation of HCM’s pattern of reduced quantity (i.e., 
medium) and the distorted quality (i.e., message) of future thinking, we presume that 
encoding and consolidating ongoing experience updates the autobiographical memory base 
(where self and memory information intersect within different levels of abstraction, from 
specific episodes to more abstract knowledge such as self-images, lifetime periods and 
general events, see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005). Thus, a lack of 
updating will affect the self and memory, especially the relation between episodic memories 
and the self (see Rathbone et al., 2009; although stable aspects of memory and the self, 
established before neurological injury, may be relatively unaffected, see Prebble, Addis & 
Tippett, 2013 for a comprehensive review and theoretical framework). Episodic memories 
may be especially important for the self as, in contrast to semantic memory, it has an inherent 
sense that one is re-experiencing an event in the present moment (Tulving, 1985; Prebble et 
al., 2013). In addition, we argue that a lack of updating can also cause personally implausible 
future thoughts (as was observed in HCM, but not controls) inasmuch as confidently believed 
future thoughts could be based on accessible but outdated mnemonic elements (see Conway, 
Loveday & Cole, 2015 for a more thorough treatment). In short, episodic future thinking 
could be highly constrained by one’s current autobiographical memory, which itself 
determines self-perceptions, memory retrieval and shapes current goal structures (Conway, 
2005): Episodic future thoughts of a final year university student will likely be very different 
from her episodic future thoughts as a high-school student because, amongst other factors, 
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new autobiographical memories from the university period will shape, and limit, new goals 
and episodic future thoughts.  
We argue that – without neurological damage - HCM might have described personally 
plausible future scenarios drawing upon recent events (as did the age-matched controls). 
Instead, with AA and temporally graded RA, he described future events with relevance to 
previous lifetime periods (e.g., owning an apartment) that are not relevant to current 
circumstances, and this could appear as confabulation-like behaviour (cf. Cole et al., 2014; 
Dalla Barba et al., 1997): Confabulation-like behaviour that, at some point in HCM’s past, 
would have been relevant.  
Another area worthy of discussion is awareness, which, as clinical professionals 
appreciate, is often compromised after brain injury. This is a critical issue in 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, as some patients are not aware of their deficits and the 
restrictions that these may impose on their present (and future) life (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). It 
is possible that self-awareness may be associated with the content of personally implausible  
episodic future thoughts. In neuropsychological models of awareness, a distinction is made 
between self-knowledge (knowledge one brings to each task) and on-line awareness (i.e., 
self-monitoring and -regulation within a task, see Crosson et al., 1989; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). 
Indeed, it is postulated within a recent model (Toglia and Kirk, 2000) that in addition to other 
factors, previous self-knowledge (memories) may inform expectancies – a construct which 
may overlap, or be associated, with episodic future thinking (see Szpunar, Spreng & 
Schacter, 2014 for a relevant taxonomy of future-oriented cognition). The link between 
awareness and episodic future thinking in acquired brain injury is undoubtedly a complex 
issue. However, this investigation suggests that memory failure may not only lead to reduced 
and personally implausible future thoughts, but may also indicate wider self-awareness 
deficits.  
AMNESIA AND FUTURE THINKING  20 
 
Another factor related to personally implausible future events is self-enhancement. 
One possibility is that HCM created self-enhancing future events in order to escape the 
barriers to independence he experiences in daily life at the rehabilitation centre5. An 
unrealistic future could be ‘motivated’ toward a wished-for version of the self (Conway and 
Taachi, 1996, see also Fotopoulou, 2010). However, the extent to which HCM’s apparent 
future positivity bias is due to memory disturbances or other cognitive disturbances (e.g., 
executive dysfunction, lack of self-awareness) is presently unclear.  
Another question should also be considered: What was the potential consequence of 
executive impairments on HCM’s past and future scenarios? A body of research now 
indicates that executive function, mediated by prefrontal regions, can effect autobiographical 
memory (Simons & Spiers, 2003). In particular, damage to prefrontal cortex typically affects 
cognitive control and monitoring of memory retrieval (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Simons & 
Spiers). There is evidence from healthy (D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier & Van der 
Linden,, 2010; Cole, Morrison & Conway, 2013) and brain-damaged individuals (Berryhill, 
Picasso, Arnold et al., 2010; de Vito, Gamboz, Brandimonte et al., 2012) that executive 
function also has a role in EFT. In a study of individuals with Parkinsons disease, patients 
produced future events with reduced episodic detail, especially when novel event 
constructions were required (de Vito et al., 2012). In cases with extensive PFC damage, the 
monitoring component of episodic future thinking becomes more transparent, as patients 
misperceive extremely implausible future events as personally plausible (patient MW, Cole et 
al., 2014). Currently, the limited amount of extant cognitive and neuropsychological research 
limits an accurate view on the role of executive function in episodic future thinking. In terms 
of HCM, his limited executive impairments (see Table 1) and lack of confabulations indicate 
that his major impairments were memory-related.  
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The principal aim of the current investigation was to examine the phenomenon of 
episodic future thoughts after compromised autobiographical memory accessibility, not to 
comprehensively distinguish between several explanations: This would require a larger pool 
of data. Future research will be necessary to clarify the extent to which the personally 
implausible content of amnesics’ future thoughts is due to memory accessibility, awareness, 
executive function, self-enhancement or a combination of these (possibly interacting) factors.  
Lastly, it is interesting to note that at first blush, the data from HCM appear to support 
the finding of one study demonstrating unimpaired medium of future thinking in neurological 
patients with damage to regions associated with declarative memory processes (Squire et al., 
2010; but see Maguire & Hassabis, 2011). In particular, results from HCM appear to be 
similar to those from patient GP (with focal medial temporal lobe damage), who produced 
coherent episodic future thoughts despite impaired autobiographical memory from his recent 
life. Like here, it was argued that GP used his remote autobiographical memory to construct 
future scenarios (Squire et al., 2010). As opposed to Squire and colleagues though, our data 
agrees with the idea that episodic memory is functionally necessary (see Humphreys & Price, 
2001) for future thinking because a reduced medium in past and future thinking was found in 
HCM (note that other patients in Squire et al did not exhibit severe deficits in 
autobiographical memory, see Maguire & Hassabis, 2011). On the whole, comparisons 
between this study and that of Squire et al (2010) should be made with caution because of 
differences in assessment tools and the neuropsychological profiles of the patients across 
studies.   
Methodological Limitations 
At this point, it is important to highlight some methodological limitations associated 
with neuropsychological investigations of this nature. Like almost all single case designs, our 
data is taken from post-injury assessment. Therefore, the precise change in memory capacity 
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due to neurological damage is assessed by comparing premorbid estimations (here, TOPF-
UK) and scores from an age-matched group of neurologically unimpaired individuals with 
the patient’s post-injury performance. However, considering HCM’s educational history and 
pre-morbid estimates, it is inferred that pre-morbidly he was intelligent and had at least 
normal cognitive abilities, and therefore the significant decline in memory function was due 
to neurological damage. Secondly, due to restrictions imposed by the questions of the AMI, 
the precise onset and gradient of RA is difficult to estimate. Yet, HCM presented with a clear 
degradation in autobiographical memories experienced before the onset of neurological 
impairment (i.e., at 51-55 years of age, see Results), in addition to clear AA-related deficits 
thereafter. Thirdly, we focus here on the effect of memory in future thinking and 
subsequently tested episodic and semantic aspects of his autobiographical knowledge (i.e., 
there was no objective measure of encoding). However, and notwithstanding the possible (but 
moderate) role of executive deficits in future thinking (e.g., deVito, Gamboz, Brandimonte et 
al., 2012, see discussion above), the case of HCM replicated the robust link between episodic 
memory and future thinking from the amnesia literature (Schacter et al., 2012 for a review).  
Lastly, we acknowledge that group studies of patients with well-characterised 
acquired neurological damage who thereafter experience focal AA will be necessary. If our 
general explanation is correct, episodic future thoughts will be extracted and recombined 
from available autobiographical knowledge. Based on the constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis (Schacter and Addis, 2007), both memories and episodic future thoughts should 
be outdated, pertaining to periods preceding memory impairment.  
Implications for Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 
It is presumed here that distorted and outdated episodic future thinking can have 
clinical implications for self-regulation, motivation and appropriate behaviour. Firstly, 
personalised and collaborative goal setting is becoming more prevalent for patients in 
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Neuropsychological Rehabilitation Centres (e.g., McMillan & Sparks, 1999). However, this 
case study highlights how personally implausible episodic future thoughts could disrupt or 
prevent effective rehabilitation goal setting and goal attainment (i.e., patients being less 
motivated to set goals that they cannot imagine). Also, it is an open question whether 
personally implausible episodic future thoughts that patients can envisage are related to the 
overestimation of current and expected functional skills typically found after neurological 
damage (Prigatano, 1996; cf. HCM’s future thought concerning his apartment). Secondly, as 
previously alluded to, the link between self-awareness and episodic future thinking is an area 
which deserves empirical attention. Thirdly, in agreement with Andelman et al (2010), a 
fruitful research endeavour may be in formalizing reliable measurement of episodic future 
thinking in clinical patients, especially those with significant episodic memory difficulties. 
Presently, available questionnaires (e.g., Memory and Temporal Experience Questionnaire, 
Klein et al., 2002) are used principally for research purposes. However, more detailed work is 
required to establish the reliability of these measures in clinical populations, as well as the 
concurrent and predictive validity of related constructs (e.g., decision making, self-
regulation). In this way, researchers can investigate the link between future thinking disorders 
and other clinically relevant cognitive and behavioural disorders. 
Summary 
The case of HCM highlights a novel aspect of prospection difficulties resulting from 
neurogenic memory problems. Specifically, we show that extended periods of AA, and 
temporally graded RA, can lead to an outdated autobiographical memory base which in turn 
results in highly implausible episodic future thoughts. The implications for this upon self-
awareness and goal-setting should be a priority for future research. 
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Footnotes 
 
 
Footnote 1: Rispiridone, 1mg daily for mania, used as mood stabiliser; melatonin MR 2 mg 
daily for insomnia; Sodium Valproate 500mg 3 times daily for mood stabilisation;, Aspirin 
75mgs once daily for prevention of cardio-vascular conditions; Simvastatin 40mgs once daily 
for raised cholesterol and Lansaprazole GR 30 mgs twice daily for lower intestinal tract 
inflammation. 
 
Footnote 2: Past and future sections of the Confabulation Battery are identical to the ‘lived 
past’ and ‘lived future’ sections in Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom (2002) Memory and Temporal 
Experience Questionnaire 
 
Footnote 3: As an exploratory measure, we also asked participants to complete a set of 
phenomenological ratings for each of their past/future responses on the Mental Time Travel 
Task (these were; vividness, emotional valence, emotional intensity, visual perspective). 
However, although these data replicated robust past-future differences (e.g., the future 
positivity bias), no theoretically significant differences were identified between ratings of the 
healthy controls and patient HCM. Thus, to present the reader with the most meaningful 
results, these data are not presented here. 
 
Footnote 4: To assess convergent validity, HCM and controls’ responses to Autobiographical 
Incidents on the AMI were also coded according to the Levine et al. (2002) coding scheme. 
This showed a correspondence between this measure and the 0-3 scale of specificity used 
herein (r = .47, p < .005).  
 
Footnote 5: We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Axial section of patient HCM from a structural MRI scan (produced in 2008). This 
section illustrates the extent of his enlarged left ventricle, and small vessel change bilaterally 
(indicated by black arrows). Identification of damage to the hippocampus was unfeasible due 
to the sections (no coronal view) and the resolution of the above scan. 
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Table 1.  HCM’s Performance on Standardised Neuropsychology Measures  
 
Measure Score Description 
Pre-morbid IQ (TOPF-UK)   
Full Scale IQ 104 Average 
Verbal Comprehension 103 Average 
Perceptual Reasoning 104 Average 
Working Memory 106 Average 
Processing Speed 101 Average 
General Cognitive Function (WAIS-IV)   
Verbal Comprehension 96 Average 
Perceptual Reasoning 63 Extremely Low 
Working Memory 55 Extremely Low 
Processing Speed 50 Extremely Low 
Anterograde Memory (WMS-IV)   
Auditory Memory 57 Extremely Low 
Visual Memory 40 Extremely Low 
Immediate Memory 63 Extremely Low 
Delayed Memory 40 Extremely Low 
Executive Function(DK-EFS)   
Category Switching (Correct) 3 Impaired 
Category Switching (Accuracy)  2  Impaired 
20 Questions Test  14  Above average 
Word Context Test 9 Average 
Proverb Test  7 Borderline impaired 
Note: All tests were administered by clinical staff in 2013. Descriptions of performance on 
DK-EFS sub-tests were based on a 1 SD cut-off signifying impairment. Category Switching 
scores were both part of the Verbal Fluency tasks of the DK-EFS Battery. All scaled scores 
were age-corrected according to the relevant test manuals.  
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Table 2. HCM’s pattern of Total Sematic and Episodic Scores on the AMI compared with 
Normative Scores (range in parentheses) and Healthy Controls.   
 
 Personal Semantic Autobiographical Incidents 
 HCM (Normative 
range) 
HCM (Normative 
Range) 
HC Mean (SD) 
Childhood 18 (16-21) 8 (6-9) 7.67 (1.15) 
Early Adulthood 12 (17-21) 6 (7-9) 7.67 (1.15) 
Recent Life 2.5 (19-21) 1 (7-9) 8.67 (0.58)* 
Cumulative Total 32.5 (54-63) 15 (19-27) 24 (2.65)+ 
 
Note: HC = Healthy Controls. Normative scores taken from the AMI manual (Kopelman, 
Wilson & Baddeley, 1990). Significant differences (p < .05, two-tailed) between HCM and 
healthy controls, as analysed with Crawford & Garthwait (2002) single case statistics, are 
denoted by *. + represents a marginally significant difference (p = .098). 
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Table 3. HCM’s Performance on the Confabulation Battery Compared with Healthy Controls 
(percentages) 
 
 Correct Incorrect Confab. Don’t Know 
 HCM HC HCM HC HCM HC HCM HC 
Personal Semantic 58 - 16 - 5 - 21 - 
General Semantic 60 - 0 - 0 - 40 - 
Orientation 50 - 20 - 10 - 20 - 
Episodic Past 10 100 0 0 10 0 80 0 
Episodic Future 20 93 0 7 30 0 50 0 
‘DK’ Episodic - - 22 - 0 - 78 - 
‘DK’ Semantic - - 0 - 0 - 100 - 
 
 
Note: HC = Healthy Controls. All instances of DK / “don’t know” represent omissions by 
HCM except the “Don’t know” Episodic and “Don’t know” Semantic sections, in which 
“Don’t Know” was the most appropriate response. Incorrect = minor errors. 
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Figure 1. Axial section of patient HCM from a structural MRI scan (produced in 2008). This 
section illustrates the extent of his enlarged left ventricle, and small vessel change bilaterally 
(indicated by red arrows). Identification of damage to the hippocampus was unfeasible due to 
the sections (no coronal view) and the resolution of the above scan. 
Running Head: AMNESIA AND FUTURE THINKING  37 
 
Appendix 
Representative Excerpts from HCM and Healthy Controls (HC) on the Past and Future Episodic Sections of the Confabulation Battery 
 
Past Episodic Future Episodic 
Questions Patient HCM HC Comparison Questions Patient HCM HC Comparison 
Who did you see this morning? 
 
 
 
“Can’t remember” 
 
“My son and just 
people in the 
street” [V, HC1] 
Who are you going to see 
this evening? 
“Don’t know” 
 
“I’m going to see 
my choir” 
[personal plaus. = 
5, HC2] 
 
What did you do yesterday? 
 
 
 
 
“Can’t remember at 
all” 
 
“We were cooking 
a lot at my son’s 
house at Bristol: 
We had my son’s 
girlfriend’s parents 
for a meal” [V, 
HC2] 
What are you going to do 
tomorrow? 
“No idea- Talk 
about what I’m 
doing here”  
[personal plaus.=2]  
“I’ve got to do 
some work on my 
motorbike. And I 
will be fiddling 
about that for 
about two hours...” 
[personal plaus. = 
5, HC3] 
What did you do the day before 
yesterday? 
 
 
 
“Can’t remember” “Nothing much -I 
just went to 
Sainsbury’s and 
spoke to my sister 
on the phone” [V, 
HC1] 
When will be the next 
time you visit a friend? 
 
“Don’t know” 
 
“I’ll be seeing a 
friend tomorrow 
afternoon when I 
go to the sewing 
group” [personal 
plaus. = 4, HC2] 
Do you remember the last time 
you went to see a doctor? 
 
 
 
“No” “Last time I saw 
my GP would have 
been 6 weeks ago” 
[V, HC2] 
When will be the next 
time you visit a doctor? 
“Don’t know” 
 
“audiologist… I 
might pop in and 
see him in the next 
two weeks” 
[personal plaus. = 
5, HC3] 
How did you spend last 
Christmas? 
 
 
 
“No idea” 
 
“We went to 
Austria to do some 
cross country 
skiing” [V, HC2] 
When will be the next 
time you go to a 
restaurant? 
“When I can afford 
it -don’t know” 
[personal plaus.=3] 
“Probably on 
Thursday with my 
sister, we shall 
probably have a 
meal out; a lunch 
or Dinner.” 
[personal plaus. = 
5, HC1] 
 
Note: V = verified memory, U = unverified memory (by confederate); Personal plausibility scale ranges from 1-5, 1=implausible, 5=plausibility
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